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INTRODUCTION
Successor liability is an exception to the
general rule that, when one corporate or other
juridical person sells assets to another entity,
the assets are transferred free and clear of all
but valid liens and security interests. When
successor liability is imposed, a creditor or
plaintiff with a claim against the seller may assert that claim against and collect payment
from the purchaser.
Historically, successor liability was a flexible doctrine, designed to eliminate the harsh
results that could attend strict application of
corporate law. Over time, however, as successor liability doctrines evolved, they became, in
many jurisdictions, ossified and lacking in
flexibility. As this occurred, corporate lawyers
and those who structure transactions learned
how to avoid application of successor liability
doctrines. 2 This article summarizes what has
1 Associate Professor of Law and Director of the
Clayton Center for Entrepreneurial Law at The University of Tennessee College of Law. He is the author
of THE ELEMENTs OF CoNTRACT DRAFTING (West 2003),
CoNTRACTs: TRANSACTONS AND LITIGATION

(Co-author

Prof. Robert Lloyd; West 2006), and CALAFORNIA LAW
OF CONTRACTS (CEB 2006), as well as a number of law
review and other articles dealing with business, contracts, Chapter 11, and insolvency issues. http://
www.law.utk.edu/FACULTY/Kuney/kuney.htm.
2 See George W. Kuney, A Taxonomy and
Evaluation of Successor Liability, 3 FLA. ST. U. Bus.
REv. 1 (2006).

become of various species of non-statutory
successor liability in Pennsylvania. 3
There are two broad groups of successor liability doctrines, those that are judge-made (the
"common law" exceptions) and those that are
creatures of statute. Both represent a distinct
public policy that, in certain instances and for
certain liabilities, the general rule of non-liability of a successor for a predecessor's debts
following an asset sale should not apply. This
article addresses the status of the first group,
judge-made successor liability in Pennsylvania.
The current judge-made successor liability
law is a product of the rise of corporate law in
the last half of the 19th century and early part
of the 20th century. It appears to have developed because of and in reaction to the rise of
corporate law. It may be better to characterize
it as a part of that body of law, much like the
"alter ego" or "piercing the corporate veil"
doctrines, 4 rather than as a creature of tort law,
although it is used as a tool by plaintiffs who
are involuntary tort claimants.
Many sources and authorities list four, five,
or six basic types of situations in which judgemade successor liability has sometimes been
recognized-(1) express or implied assumption, (2) fraud, (3) de facto merger, (4) mere
continuation, (5) continuity of enterprise, and
(6) product line, for example.5 In fact, the mat-

3 A detailed jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction analysis
and explanation of the state of judge-made successor
liability law may be found at www.law.utk.edu/
Faculty/APPENDLXKuney.htm. The author intends
to update this analysis at least twice a year so that it
remains current.
4 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Collapsing
Corporate Structures: Resolving the Tension
Between Form and Substance, 60 Bus. LAW. 109
(2004).
5 See Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply Co., 18

P.3d 49 (2001) (discussing varied approaches to determination of whether successor liability was a
creature of contract and corporate law or tort law as
part of its choice of law analysis and concluding that
successor liability is a tort doctrine designed to expand products liability law; collecting cases and
other authorities on both sides of the issue).
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ter is more complicated than that. Each of
these species of successor liability has, within
it, different sub-species with different standards and variations in the jurisdictions that
recognize them. Some use a list of mandatory
elements while others are based on a nonexclusive list of factors and considerations to
be weighed and balanced in a "totality of the
circumstances" fashion. Some that began as an
approach consisting of a flexible list of factors
have evolved into one consisting of one or
more mandatory elements. In any event, to
state that there are only four, five, or six categories is to oversimplify the matter.6
THE STATE OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY IN
PENNSYLVANIA
When examined in detail, the types of successor liability can be classified into five general species, each of which is specifically defined on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis.
The five categories of successor liability discussed in this article are: (1) Intentional
Assumptions of Liabilities, (2) Fraudulent
Schemes to Escape Liability, (3) De Facto
Mergers, (4) The Continuity Exceptions: Mere
Continuation and Continuity of Enterprise,
and (5) The Product Line Exception.
When examining successor liability, especially when moving between jurisdictions, one
should keep in mind that there is variance and
overlap between the species and their formulation in particular jurisdictions. The label a
court uses for its test is not necessarily one
with a standardized meaning applicable across
jurisdictions. Accordingly, it is dangerous to
place too much reliance on a name; the underlying substance should always be examined.
Intentional (Express or Implied) Assumption
of Liabilities
Intentional assumption of liabilities, express
or implied, is probably the simplest of the successor liability species. Imposing liability on a
successor that by its actions is shown to have
assumed liabilities is essentially an exercise in
the realm of contract law, drawing on doctrines of construction
and the objective theory
7
of contract.

6 The variance in states' approaches to successor
liability and to the related doctrines of alter ego or
piercing the corporate veil are one of the reasons that
the federal courts have adopted a uniform federal
common law of these subjects under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). See United

Pennsylvania recognizes six species of successor liability for corporate asset purchasers,
one being where the purchaser expressly or
impliedly agrees to assume such obligation. 8
The courts did not set out a test for this assumption of liability.
FraudulentSchemes to Escape Liability
The next species of successor liability is the
doctrine based on fraud. Fraudulent schemes
to escape liability by using corporate law limitation-of-liability principles to defeat the legitimate interests of creditors illustrate an example of the need for successor liability to prevent
injustice. If a corporation's equity holders, for
example, arrange for the company's assets to
be sold to a new company in which they also
hold an equity or other stake for less value
than would be produced if the assets were
deployed by the original company in the ordinary course of business, then the legitimate
interests and expectations of the company's
creditors have been frustrated. 9 By allowing liability to attach to the successor corporation in
such instances, the creditors' interests and expectations are respected. The challenge, of
course, is defining the standard that separates
the fraudulent scheme from the legitimate one.
Pennsylvania also recognizes successor liability where the transaction is fraudulently entered into to escape liability, or where the
transfer was not made for adequate consideration and provisions were not made for the
creditors of the transferor. 10
De Facto Merger
In a statutory merger, the successor corporation becomes liable for the predecessor's
debts.11 The de facto merger species of succes7 Michael J. Zaino, Bielagus v. EMBE: New
Hampshire Rejects Traditional Test for Corporate
Successor Liability Following an Asset Purchase,

45.N.H. B.J 26 (2004).
8 In re Thorotrast Cases, 26 Phila. Co. Rptr. 479,
488-89, 1994 W.L. 1251120 (Pa. Com. P1. 1994);

Morgan v. Powe Timber Co., 367 F.Supp. 2d 1032
(S.D. Miss. 2005).
9 Causation is a required element of all species of
the fraud exception. See, e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Duro
Textiles, LLC, 19 Mass. L. Rep. 509 (2005) (discussing need for causation, but also that judgment
creditors could look to company's long term prospects, not just immediate insolvency).
10 In re Thorotrast Cases, 26 Phila. Co. Rptr. 479,
488-89, 1994 W.L. 1251120 (Pa. Com. P1. 1994);
Morgan v. Powe Timber Co., 367 F.Supp.2d 1032

States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 298-301

(2005).
11 G. William Joyner, III, Beyond Budd Tire:
Examining SuccessorLiability in North Carolina,30

(3d Cir. 2005) (collecting authorities).

WAKE FOREST L. REV. 889, 894 (1995).
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sor liability creates the same result in the asset
sale context to avoid allowing form to overcome substance. A de facto merger, then, allows liability to attach when an asset sale has
mimicked the results of a statutory merger except for the continuity of liability. The main
difference between the sub-species of de facto
merger various jurisdictions is how rigid or
flexible the test is. In other words, how many
required elements must be shown to establish
applicability of the doctrine? On one end of
the spectrum is the lengthy, mandatory checklist of required elements. On the other, the
non-exclusive list of factors to be weighed in a
totality of the circumstances fashion.
Most Pennsylvania courts note that, under
Pennsylvania law, the mere continuation and
de facto merger exceptions are interrelated if
not completely conflated. 12 "[A] mere continuation occurs where 'a new corporation is
formed to acquire the assets of an extant corporation, which then ceases to exist."' 13 "The
primary elements of the continuation exception are identity of the officers, directors, or
shareholders, and the existence of a single corporation following the transfer.'1 4 The factors
to consider for de facto merger are "(1) continuity of ownership; (2) cessation of the ordinary business by, and dissolution of, the predecessor as soon as practicable; (3) assumption
by the successor of liabilities ordinarily necessary for uninterrupted continuation of the
business; and (4) continuity of the management, personnel, physical location, and the
general business operation."' 5 Not all of the de

facto merger factors16 must be present for the
exception to apply.
Since mere continuation traditionally requires "common identity of officers, directors
and stock between the selling and purchasing
corporations,"117 and since Pennsylvania treats
the defacto merger factors as nondispositive,' 8
there may be an open question as to whether
commonality of ownership is a threshold requirement for de facto merger. It appears that
as soon as mere continuation is subsumed into
de facto merger, commonality of ownership is
reduced to a considered factor instead of a required element.
Continuation of the Business: The Continuity
Exceptions
An exception with two distinct subcategories permits successor liability when the
successor continues the business of the seller:
mere continuation and continuity of enterprise. Each has sub-species particular to specific jurisdictions within them. The two share
roughly the same indications but continuity of
enterprise does not require continuity of shareholders or directors or officers between the
predecessor and the successor-a requirement
said to be one of the mere continuation exception's dispositive elements or factors.' 9 Courts

16
17

Id.
Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co.

,

434 A.2d at

106, 108.

18 See Cont'l Ins. Co., 810 A.2d at 135.
19 REST. 3D TORTS §12, cmt. g.; AM. L. PROD. LIAB.

12 Lavelle v. Lavco, Inc., 555 A.2d 218, 227 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1989) (applying the de facto merger ex-

3D §7:20 (2004). See, e.g., Holloway v. John C.
Smith's Sons, 432 F.Supp. 454, 456 (D.S.C. 1977)

(denying summary judgment to the defendant successor in a products liability suit because (1) the
business continued at its same address with virtually all of the previous employees; (2) the successor
ficult to distinguish"); Atlas Tool Co., Inc. v. C.I.R.,
was responsible for maintenance and repairs on the
614 F.2d 860, 871 (3rd Cir. 1980) ("As is illustrated
products sold by the predecessor prior to its sale of
by the de facto merger cases, that exception is inter- assets; (3) the successor continued manufacturing
related to the second exception for continuity."); the same or similar products as the predecessor; and
U.S. v. Gen. Battery Corp., Inc., 423 F.3d 294, 307 (3d
(4) the successor held itself out to the public as a
Cir. 2005); Vill. Builders 96, L.P v. U.S. Laboratories, business entity under a virtually identical name as
Inc., 112 P.3d 1082 (2005); Fiber-Lite Corp. v. Molded
its predecessor; not requiring continuity of ownerAcoustical Prods. Of Easton, Inc., 186 B.R. 603, 608
ship and control but calling the doctrine applied
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (noting that "the continuity excep- "mere continuation" anyway.); see also Mozingo v.
tion which Fiber-Lite contended applied is actually Correct Mfg., 752 F.2d 168, 175 (5th Cir. 1985) (apsubsumed by the de facto merger exception"); Berg plying Mississippi law and citing Holloway Cyr v. B.
ception, but stating that "[e]mployment of the mere
continuation theory of liability would not alter our
resolution of the issue since the two theories are dif-

Chilling Systems., Inc. v. Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455
(3d Cir. 2006); Glentel, Inc. v. Wireless Ventures, LLC,
362 F.Supp.2d 992 (N.D. Ind. 2005).

which Holloway relied) as cases following the conti-

13 Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Schneider, Inc., 810 A.2d 127,
134 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002); Berg ChillingSystems., Inc.
v. Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455 (2006).
14 Cont'l Ins. Co., 810 A.2d Id. at 134-35 (citations

§7:22 (noting that the court in Holloway denied
summary judgment to a successor despite a lack of
continuity of ownership even though the court
treated its ruling as an application of the mere con-

omitted).

tinuation theory); 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PROD. LIAB.
§19:6, n. 25 (3d. ed. 2003) (noting an increasing

15 Id. at 135.

Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (upon
nuity of enterprise theory); AM. L. PROD. LIAB. 3D
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are not altogether careful or uniform in labeling which exception they are applying. The
similarity of these doctrines
to those of de
20
facto merger is striking.
Mere Continuation
See the discussion above relating to the
de factor doctrine as compared to "mere
continuation."
Continuity of Enterprise
Unlike the more traditional and long standing mere continuation exception, the continuity of enterprise theory does not require strict
continuity of shareholders or owners (and
possibly directors and officers) between the
predecessor and the successor-although the
degree or extent of continuity of owners, directors and officers is a factor. 21 Further, continuity of enterprise generally does not include
the requirement of dissolution of the predecessor upon or soon after the sale, which is often
a factor-and sometimes a requirement-in

number of courts have adopted the continuity of enterprise exception including the Holloway court and
the Ohio Supreme Court in Flaugher v. Cone
Automatic Mach. Co., 30 Ohio St. 3d (1987) (this
treatise is authored by David Owen, the Carolina
Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of
South Carolina); Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Redesigning
Successor Liability, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 845, 854-55,
n. 44 (1999) (noting that states following the continuity of enterprise approach include South Carolina
(citing Holloway); Ohio (citing Flaugher), Alabama,
Michigan, Mississippi, and New Hampshire (citing
Cyr v. B. Offen); Philip I. Blumberg, The Continuity
of the Enterprise Doctrine:CorporateSuccessorship
in United States Law, 10 FLA. J. INT'L L. 365, 375-76
(1996) (collecting cases applying the continuity of
enterprise theory, including Holloway and Flaugher);
30 S.C. JUR. PRODucTs LIABILrrY §12 (stating the court
in Holloway denied the successor's motion for summary judgment "where the evidence indicated that
the [successor] was a mere continuation of the predecessor corporation"); REST. 3D TORTS §2, cmt. c
(citing only Alabama, Michigan, and New Hampshire
as jurisdictions that have adopted the continuity of
enterprise theory).
20 Gladstone v. Stuart Cinemas, Inc., 878 A.2d
214, 221-22 (Vt. 2005). Cases from the beginning of
the last century in Idaho preserve another term that
seems to capture all or part of the de facto merger,
mere continuation, and continuity of enterprise exceptions: "reorganization."
21 Mozingo, 752 F.2d at 174-75 (noting that the traditional mere continuation exception requires identity of stockholders, directors and officers); see also
Savage Arms Inc. v. W Auto Supply, 18 P.2d 49, 55
(Alaska 2001) (mere continuation theory requires
"the existence of identical shareholders").

jurisdictions
applying the mere continuation
22
doctrine.
A detailed examination of continuity of enterprise in the jurisdictions that have adopted
it discloses three sub-species at work. All the
variations of the continuity of enterprise exception
derive from Turner v. Bituminous Cas.
23
Co.
Variations in the application of the
Turner factors create the three sub-species.
In Turner, the Michigan Supreme Court expanded the four traditional categories of successor liability, and in so doing, developed
a continuity of enterprise theory of successor
liability.24 The court adopted the rule that, in

the sale of corporate assets for cash, three
criteria would be the threshold guidelines to
establish whether there is continuity of enterprise between the transferee and the transferor
corporations.
(1] There is a continuation of the enterprise
of the seller corporation, so that there is
a continuity of management, personnel,
physical location, assets, and general
business operations;
(2) The seller corporation ceases its ordinary business operations, liquidates, and
dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible; and
(3) The purchasing corporation assumes
those liabilities and obligations of the
seller ordinarily necessary for the interrupted continuation of normal business
25
operations of the seller corporation.
The Michigan Supreme Court did not address the limits of the continuity of enterprise
exception again until 1999 in Foster v. ConeBlanchard Mach. Co. 26 In Foster, a plaintiff,

22 See, e.g., Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244
N.W.2d 873, 882 (Mich. 1976) (dissolution of the
seller soon after the sale one of four enumerated fac-

tors indicating continuity of enterprise).
23 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976).
24 Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873
(Mich. 1976).
25 Id. at 879 (citing McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co.,
Div. of Harris-IntertypeCorp., 264 A.2d 98, 103, 105
(1970)). These are three of the four factors from
McKee used to determine whether liability will arise
under the de facto merger form of successor liability.
26 597 N.W.2d 506 (Mich. 1999). In the interim,

the court cited Turner in three decisions, none of
which clarified the key Turner holding. Jeffery v.
Rapid American Corp., 529 N.W.2d 644, 656 (Mich.
1995) (citing Turner for the proposition that corpo-

rate law principles should not be rigidly applied in
products liability cases); Stevens v. McLough Steel
Prods. Corp., 466 N.W.2d 95, 99 (Mich. 1989) (citing

Turner as a case where the Michigan Supreme Court
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injured while operating a feed screw machine,
sued the corporate successor after receiving a
$500,000 settlement from the predecessor corporation.27 The court held that "because [the]
predecessor was available for recourse as witnessed by plaintiff's negotiated settlement
with the predecessor for $500,000, the continuity of enterprise
theory of successor liability
' 28
is inapplicable.
The Foster court thus resolved two issues
left open in Turner. First, the Michigan appellate decisions prior to Foster cited Turner for
the proposition that the continuity of enterprise test was comprised of four elements or
factors, following the four items enumerated in
the Turner court's holding and not the three
listed in its announcement of the rule. 29 The
Foster court clarified that, in fact, only three
items are involved in the Turnerrule, and they
are required elements.30
Second, the Fostercourt held that the "'continuity of enterprise' doctrine applies only
when the transferor is no longer viable and capable of being sued."' 31 The court's interpreta-

tion of the underlying rationale of Turner was
"to provide a source of recovery for injured
plaintiffs." 32 According to Justice Brickley, the
Turner court expanded liability based on the
successor's continued enjoyment of "certain
continuing benefits": "[T]he test in Turner is
designed to determine whether the company
(or enterprise)" involved in the lawsuit is essentially the same company that was allegedly
negligent in designing
or manufacturing the
33
offending product.
The Foster decision thus appears to return
Michigan law to its state immediately after
Turnerwas decided: continuity of enterprise is
a recognized doctrine of successor liability and
the doctrine has three required elements. To
the extent that intervening decisions had
narrowed Turner with the addition of a fourth
factor-whether the purchasing corporation
holds itself out to the world as the effective
continuation of the seller corporation-that
revision of the doctrine appears to have been
reversed. Further, to the extent that Turner's
"guidelines" had been considered factors
by
other courts adopting the continuity of enterprise, the Foster court made it clear that it
discussed the doctrine of successor liability in the interpreted its own rule as one comprised of
context of a products liability suit); Langley v. Harris elements.
Pennsylvania has not adopted the conCorp., 321 N.W.2d 662, 664-65 (Mich. 1982) (citing
Turner for the proposition that an acquiring corpora- tinuity of enterprise doctrine, having adopted
tion maybe held liable for products liability claims a flexible, factor-based mere continuation
arising from activities of its predecessor corporation doctrine.
under a continuity of enterprise theory but then
holding that the Turner rationale will not allow a The Product Line
Exception of Ray v. Alad
corporation to seek indemnity from the plaintiff's
employer in a products liability suit). One appellate
In Ray v. Alod,34 the California Supreme
court decision between Turnerand Fosterconcluded Court recognized the product line exception to
that satisfying the fourth consideration in Turner the general rule of successor non-liability. It is
(the purchasing corporation's holding itself out as a a species of liability
that is very similar to concontinuation of the selling corporation) was not sufficient for a finding of successor liability where the tinuity of enterprise. The court articulated the
first three considerations were not met. Pelc v. following "justifications" for imposing liability on a successor corporation:
Bendix Mach. Tool Corp., 314 N.W.2d 614, 620
(Mich. Ct. App. 982) (Where a successor bought only
(1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiff's
8% of the assets of another corporation in a bankremedies against the original manufacturer
ruptcy sale and did not meet the first three criteria
caused by the successor's acquisition of the
of Turner but held itself out as a continuation of the
business, (2) the successor's ability to assume
liquidating corporation, the mere continuation test
the original manufacturer's risk spreading
was not satisfied. The court noted that to impose
role, and (3) the fairness of requiring the sucsuccessor liability in such circumstances would
cessor to assume a responsibility for defective
effectively be an adoption of the broader "product
products that was a burden necessarily atline exception").
tached to the original manufacturer's good27 597 N.W.2d at 508.
will being enjoyed by the successor35 in the
28Id.
continued operation of the business.
29 Fenton Area Pub. Sch. v. Sorensen-Gross
Constr. Co., 335 N.W.2d 225-26 (Mich. Ct. App.
1983); Lemire v. GarrardDrugs, 291 N.W.2d 103, 105
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Powers v. Baker-Perkins,Inc.,
285 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979); Pelc,
314 N.W.2d at 618; State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Pitney-Bowes, 1999 WL 33451719, at *1 (Mich. Ct.
App. April 2, 1999).
30 597 N.W. 2d at 510.
31Foster, 597 N.W.2d at 511.

32 Id. Justice Brickley, in dissent, disagreed with
the majority as to the underlying rationale of Turner.
33 Id.

at 513.
34 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977).
35 Id.at 9.
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The term "justifications" is somewhat ambiguous as to whether it connotes required
elements or non-exclusive factors to be balanced, much like the Turner guidelines.
Like the Michigan Supreme Court in Foster,
which revisited Turner some years after the
original opinion was issued, the California
Supreme Court returned to Ray v. Alad some
years later to "clarify" things. In Henkel Corp.
v. Hartford Accident. & Indemn. Co.,3 6 the
California Supreme Court referred to these
three justifications as conditions, thus suggesting that they were essential elements under
the product line exception. Despite its name,
the product line theory of successor liability
appears only rarely, if at all, to have been applied in a reported decision to a successor that
had acquired merely one of many product
lines from the predecessor; in nearly all reported cases, it appears to have been applied
to sales of substantially all of a predecessor's
assets. 37 In fact, one court has emphasized that
the "policy justifications for our adopting the
product line rule require the transfer of subassets to the
stantially all of the predecessor's
38
successor corporation."
The product line doctrine, where accepted,
breaks into two distinct sub-species. The two
differ only as to whether Ray's "virtual destruction of the plaintiff's [other] remedies"
condition is strictly required in order to permit
recovery.
In 1981, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
adopted the product line exception. 39 The
court was careful to keep the product line
exception from being too restrictive. 40 In
essence, the court adopted the New Jersey
product line exception over that applied by
California courts:
We also believe it better not to phrase the new
exception too tightly. Given its philosophical
origin, it should be phrased in general terms,
so that in any particular case the court may
consider whether it is just to impose liability
on the successor corporation. The various factors identified in the several cases discussed
above will always be pertinent for example,

36 62 P.3d 69, 73 (Cal. 2003).
37George W. Kuney &Donna C. Looper, Successor
Liability in California,20 CEB CAL. Bus. L. PRACT. 50

(2005).
38 Hall v. Armstrong Cork, Inc., 103 Wash. 2d 258,
260 n.1 (1984) (refusing to apply product line test to
successor that purchased but one of many asbestos
product lines).
39 Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 111.
40 Id. See also Kradel v. Fox Tractor Co., 308 F.3d
328, 331 (3d Cir. 2002).

whether the successor corporation advertised
itself as an ongoing enterprise, Cyr v. B. Offen
& Co.; or whether it maintained the same
product, name, personnel, property, and

clients, Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co.; or
whether it acquired the predecessor corporation's name and good will, and required the
predecessor to dissolve, Knapp v. North
American Rockwell Corp. Also, it will always

be useful to consider whether the three-part
test stated in Ray v. Alad Corp. has been met.
The exception will more likely realize its reason for being, however, if such details are not
made part of its formulation. The formulation
Industries,
of the court in Ramirez v. Amsted
41
Inc. is well-put, and we adopt it.
Interestingly, Pennsylvania courts have "tightened" the phrasing of the product line exception in subsequent decisions. In Pizio v. JohnsManville Corp., the Court of Common Pleas of
Pennsylvania concluded that the product line
exception requires, as a threshold matter, the
successor to acquire all or substantially all of

the predecessor's assets. 42 In Hill v. Trailmo43
bile, Inc., the Pennsylvania Superior Court
' 44

"recast the three Ray factors as requirements.
Soon thereafter, the Court of Common Pleas of
Pennsylvania has subsequently stated that
"the sale of the product line must cause the
virtual destruction of the plaintiffs' remedies.
If a business goes on for years profitably after
the product line is sold and goes bankrupt for
other reasons, the sale of the product line for
not 'cause' the
adequate consideration did
45
destruction of the remedy."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has not
addressed the issue of product line successor
liability, thus leaving the lower courts to determine the contours of successor liability in
Pennsylvania, although it is likely that the
product line theory would suffer the same fate

41 Id.

42 9 Phila. Co. Rptr. 447, 452 (Pa. Com. P1. 1983)
("An examination of the relevant case law reveals
that the purpose of the product line exception is to
afford a claimant an opportunity to bring a products

liability action against a successor corporation
where his or her rights against the predecessor corporation have been essentially extinguished either
de jure, through dissolution of the predecessor, or de
facto, through sale of all or substantially all of the
assets of the predecessor.").
43 60 A.2d 602 (Pa. Super. 1992).
44 Kradel, 308 F.3d at 332.
45 In re Thorotrast Cases, 26 Phila. Co. Rptr. at
504; see also Kradel, 308 F.3d at 332 ("It is thus clear
that the inability to recover from an original manufacturer is a prerequisite in Pennsylvania to the use

of the product line exception").
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as continuity of enterprise in Pennsylvania,
given the broad, flexible contours of
Pennsyl46
vania's mere continuation doctrine.
CONCLUSION
This article and its more detailed companion pieces in the Florida State University
Business Review and on the author's website
attempt to detail some of the history and the

46 See In re ThorotrastCases, 26 Phila. Co. Rptr. at
507 (noting the absence of a Supreme Court ruling or
legislative action in regard to product line successor
liability and a "caused the destruction of plaintiff's
remedy" requirement).

current condition of successor liability law in
Pennsylvania. The purpose of the doctrines
was to provide contract and tort creditors with
an avenue of recovery against a successor entity in appropriate cases when the predecessor
that contracted with them or committed the
tort or the action that later gave rise to the tort
had sold substantially all of its assets and was
no longer a viable source of recovery. Its various species acted as a pressure relief valve on
the strict limitation of liability created by corporate law. The doctrine is in the nature of an
"equitable" doctrine insofar as it is invoked
when strict application of corporate law
would offend the conscience of the court. In
large part, the doctrine remains intact and still
serves that purpose.

